Identities in Migrant Cinema:  The Aesthetics of European Integration by Betts, Jalene
Macalester International
Volume 22 The Macalester/Maastricht Essays Article 8
Winter 2009
Identities in Migrant Cinema: The Aesthetics of
European Integration
Jalene Betts
Macalester College
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/macintl
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Institute for Global Citizenship at DigitalCommons@Macalester College. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Macalester International by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Macalester College. For more information,
please contact scholarpub@macalester.edu.
Recommended Citation
Betts, Jalene (2009) "Identities in Migrant Cinema: The Aesthetics of European Integration," Macalester International: Vol. 22, Article
8.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/macintl/vol22/iss1/8
Identities in Migrant Cinema: 
The Aesthetics of European Integration
Jalene Betts
Identity is not as transparent or unproblematic as we think. Per-
haps, instead of thinking of identity as an already accomplished 
historical fact, which the new cinematic discourses then rep-
resent, we should think, instead, of identity as a “production” 
which is never complete, always in process, and always consti-
tuted within, not outside, representation.1
Stuart Hall, 1996
I. Introduction
Although much progress was made in Europe over the last half 
century with regard to the integration of markets and the near-vapor-
ization of national borders, recent years show that, contrary to the 
illusion of an “enlightened” continent free from the racism of the past, 
ethnicity continues to play a role in European culture. As demonstrated 
by disputes in the Balkan region over Kosovo’s independence, debates 
on the acceptance of new member states into the European Union (in 
particular Turkey’s application for admittance), and growing concerns 
over immigration in the Netherlands and France, ethnicity seems to 
prove itself as a thing of the present, not the past. Media coverage of 
the “problems” of Islam—unemployed “Arab” youths roaming the 
streets, young girls forced to wear head-coverings by their “sexist” 
relatives—is a reality, whether or not the claims made by such repre-
sentations are valid.
In recent years, many scholars have debated about the effects of 
globalization on the so-called “European identity.” These debates are 
not limited to academia; everyone seems to have an opinion. While 
some academics such as Ulrich Beck promote a more benevolent, cos-
mopolitan vision of Europe, there has also been the development of 
right-wing nationalist movements arguing against the admission of 
foreigners into their countries. Right-wing nationalist movements in 
both France, under Jean-Marie Le Pen, and the Netherlands, under Pim 
Fortuyn and Geert Wilders, have targeted North African immigration 
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as a major cause of many problems in their respective countries. It is in 
some ways surprising that these sentiments have arisen in these two 
countries, as the Netherlands was until recently known for its highly 
tolerant nature while France is famous for the ideals of the French Rev-
olution, liberté, égalité, et fraternité, and consequently as a terre d’accueil, 
or “land of welcome.”
In both France and the Netherlands, the film industry is involved in 
the representation of ethnic identities from the North African diaspora. 
Post-migrant2 is the description I use to represent films of this genre, 
meaning films focusing on the lives of first- and second-generation 
North African immigrants in Europe. They are sometimes, but not 
always, written or directed by people of the corresponding heritage. 
In France, the beur cinéma movement has gained force since its debut 
in the 1980s in both the number of films focusing on the lives of people 
of North African extraction in France and in the number of direc-
tors of North African origin producing the films. In the Netherlands, 
political and social leaders like Geert Wilders and Theo van Gogh have 
used film to promote their views on immigration, while other directors 
contribute to the new mocro movie movement. The notion of a Euro-
pean identity and the surrounding debate are thus important not only 
in terms of cohesion between different European nation-states and 
between the European Union and its neighbors, but also within the dif-
ferent member nations themselves. The definition of European identity 
is a contested, important issue.
Why has this dialogue concerning European identities erupted with 
more vigor in recent years? Why have both political leaders and immi-
grants chosen film as a medium of expression for their opinions? What 
identities are being represented and by whom? This essay is the culmi-
nation of my research while studying at the University of Paris-Saint 
Denis during the autumn of 2007 in France and Maastricht University 
in the Netherlands during spring of 2008. It will thus explore the fol-
lowing two research questions: In this age of multiculturalism, how 
are European national cinemas redefining our understanding of Euro-
pean national identities, and what common aspects transcend separate 
national cinemas to support a “European” identity in post-migrant 
cinema?
The essay is divided into three major parts. The first section focuses 
on research conducted during the fall semester in Paris, France. Here 
I introduce the universalistic notions in the French national identity, 
sketch the history of North African immigration to France, discuss 
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the rise of beur cinema, and explore notions of identity in these films. 
Part two gives attention to the research conducted during the spring 
semester in Maastricht, the Netherlands. It touches lightly upon the 
history of North African immigration to the Netherlands, underlines 
the importance of the current debate about the Dutch national identity, 
reveals the nuances of the recent rise of the mocro movie movement, 
and elaborates on certain notions of Dutch-Moroccan identity in mocro 
films. The conclusion then addresses these issues in relation to global-
ization.
II. Paris: The City of Lights, Camera, and Action
A. Universalistic Notions in French Identity
France is a country that proudly embraces its contributions to the ide-
als of the European Enlightenment. Since the French Revolution in the 
18th century, “France has prided itself on being the land of equality, 
founded on an abstract concept of universal citizenship which renders 
ethnic, gendered, religious or class difference irrelevant.”3 This notion 
of “universal citizenship” is related to that of global citizenship pro-
moted by the Macalester College Institute for Global Citizenship in that 
both ideals are meant to be open to anyone and everyone. That is to 
say, neither concept presupposes who is able to be a citizen based upon 
racial, sexual, or cultural differences. However, while global citizen-
ship advocates the idea of being a citizen of the world or cosmopolitan, 
the notion of universal citizenship advanced by the French Revolution 
was intended to promote the idea that anyone throughout the world 
who so desired could be a French citizen, as long as he4 adhered to the 
principles of the Republic.5
However, recent years increasingly put into question France’s abil-
ity or even desire to uphold the principle of universal citizenship. This 
is demonstrated particularly during the last third of the 20th century 
in relation to Arab immigrants in France. The growth of racism and 
conflicting nationality laws in 1970s French society exacerbated ethnic 
tensions, increasing the hostile climate toward immigrants and their 
descendents.6 In the last few decades, French academics and the media 
have used the term la deuxième génération, or “second generation,” 
to denote people of Maghrebi descent whose parents immigrated to 
France. More recently, use of la troisième génération, “third generation,” 
continues to foster the notion that these people who, like their par-
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ents before them, were born and raised in France, are still not French. 
Thus, even the terminology used by the French discourse on identity 
perpetuates the racial notion of French identity, rather than the more 
universalistic one that the Republic likes to think it supports.
In Reframing Difference: Beur and Banlieue Filmmaking in France, Car-
rie Tarr contributes to this debate about multi-ethnicity in France and 
the consequent transformation of the French identity by exploring the 
role of filmmaking in the promotion of voices from marginalized com-
munities. Essentially, she argues that through the fostering of identity 
voiced by the ethnic “Other,” beur films encourage the development of 
a counter-discourse that allows for new ways of conceptualizing differ-
ence.7 The end of this section of the essay will explore her work on beur 
cinema in France, while the next main section will discuss the case of 
mocro cinema in the Netherlands.
B. A History of Non-Integration
France’s aforementioned “universalistic” notions of identity and its 
reputation as a land of welcome based on the principles of liberté, 
égalité, et fraternité have significantly deteriorated in the last half cen-
tury, undermined by the country’s treatment of North African immi-
grants following the Second World War.8 The history of immigration 
to France was generally one of integration, despite occasional tensions 
between immigrants and nationals over employment and housing.9 
This was the case with the many Italian, Polish, and Spanish immi-
grants that entered the country in the latter half of the 19th century and 
the early part of the 20th century.10 However, according to Benjamin 
Stora, these groups of immigrants succeeded while immigrants from 
the Maghreb did not—due in large part to the legacy of French colo-
nialism in North Africa.11
According to Karina Slimani-Direche, in neither French nor Algerian 
literature on immigration is there a distinction made between Arab 
and Berber immigrants.12 Yet this distinction is important to make, 
as it explains the further augmentation of ethnic tensions between 
immigrants and French nationals. Historically, Berbers from the Kab-
yle region in Algeria, the Republic’s most important colony,13 were the 
first immigrants to enter France for temporary work in industrial facto-
ries. Overpopulation and an insufficient traditional economy in Kabyle 
meant that young, unemployed males were eager to leave the region 
and find work to support themselves and their families. Consequently, 
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these travailleurs coloniaux represented three-quarters of immigrants 
in 1934, and over half in 1950.14 Furthermore, Berbers throughout the 
Maghreb were an ethnic minority discriminated against in many ways. 
For example, in Algeria, Arabs were given certain rights that would, 
depending on the French government of the time, fluctuate between 
a near equality with white European settlers (considered French citi-
zens) and lower levels of French tolerance, but the Berbers were nearly 
always persecuted and never considered citizens. This could only neg-
atively impact their social standing in the context of the flood of immi-
grants to France.
As registered earlier, immigrants from the Maghreb initially came 
to France to perform manual labor on farms in the countryside and in 
industrial factories in urban areas. According to Marie-Claude Blanc-
Chaléard, in the period known as Les Trente Glorieuses or the “Thirty 
Glorious Years” of immigration (between 1945 and 1975), many hun-
dreds of thousands of manual workers came from North Africa to 
France to earn a living for their families, whom they initially left at 
home in their countries of origin. At the outset, these workers were 
a welcome relief to the French economy and society, which had suf-
fered severely during World War II. However, the oil embargo of 1973 
and the consequent oil crisis had a major impact on the lives of both 
immigrants and nationals. Post-1974, France was overcome by a wave 
of xenophobia due to the pressures of unemployment and housing. 
Immigrants were viewed as a problem, and new policies prevented 
potential immigrants from legally entering the country. Also during 
this period la regroupement familial, or family reunification, began. Fam-
ilies of immigrants working in France were brought to the country 
and housed on the outskirts, or banlieues, of major cities. Furthermore, 
France’s colonial history in North Africa and the war over Algerian 
independence left a strain of deeply entrenched racism against “Arabs” 
among many French people.15
In recent media coverage of society and politics, the animus is dem-
onstrated by the rise of the extreme right-wing Front National, set 
up in 1972 by Jean-Marie Le Pen. According to a BBC profile report 
from 2002, Le Pen contends that the message about immigration that 
he promoted thirty years ago is still relevant today. He is quoted as 
saying, “Massive immigration has only just begun. It is the biggest 
problem facing France, Europe and probably the world. We risk being 
submerged.”16 More recent still is the never-ending series of affaires 
de foulard, in which Muslim girls insist on their right to wear Islamic 
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headscarves in France’s schools. These well-publicized controversies 
have called into question the relationship between France’s secular 
institutions and citizens’ religious and cultural rights. Carrie Tarr notes 
further that, “The wearing of the hijab is seen as so threatening to the 
Republican principles of universalism and laicity, as well as to the free-
dom of women, that in February 2004 the national assembly voted to 
ban such symbols in school rather than encourage tolerance for signs 
of difference.”17 Thus, at least in this case, France chose to hide signs of 
difference in an attempt to smother the potentially threatening identi-
ties that went along with them, rather than cultivate tolerance and 
promote the aspects of those identities that adhered to the principles 
of the Republic.
In Mémoires d’Immigrés, author and director Yamina Benguigui 
explores the mysterious phenomenon that characterized first-genera-
tion immigrants from North Africa throughout France: their absolute 
silence about their experiences, both in France and in the Maghreb. In 
particular, she emphasizes how the second generation, better educated 
and raised in France, is not only unwilling to perform the same man-
ual labor as their parents, but also unwilling to continue their ritual 
silence.18 Tarr concludes that the repressive political and social climate 
after 1974 forced beurs to organize—to develop associations aimed at 
combating racism and intolerance.19 It was in this climate in the 1980s 
that beur filmmakers first began to produce films that dealt with the 
problems of integration in France.
C. The Rise of Beur Cinema
It is essential to first define and discuss the significance of two French 
terms in relation to this essay: beur and banlieue. The term beur comes 
from the Parisian inverse-slang (verlan) form of the word “Arab.” It ste-
reotypically refers to a young, usually unemployed, second-generation 
male (beurette for female) of North African descent who lives or grew 
up in the banlieues (suburban ghettos) surrounding Paris. It is impor-
tant to note that, in contrast to suburbs in the United States, French 
suburbs did not develop as a refuge for middle or upper class citizens 
who wished to escape the hustle and bustle of urban life. Rather, they 
often began as bidonvilles, or shantytowns, originally built to house for-
eign migrant workers, effectively separating and isolating them from 
the French upper classes living in the city itself.20 Thus began the ten-
dency to marginalize immigrants by pushing them to the periphery—
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not only of the city itself, but also of the minds of French nationals for 
whom the immigrants were insignificant manual laborers. During and 
after decolonization, beurs increasingly became the most stigmatized 
ethnic minority in France, due in large part to both their high visibility 
and the legacy of decolonization.21
Historically, the representation of characters of North African 
descent in French films followed one of two representational schemas: 
either they were the “bad guys” (the drug dealers, prostitutes, purse-
snatchers), or they were victims peripheral to the central character. In 
either case, Carrie Tarr claims that in these films they, “are the objects 
of, and contained within, a white eurocentric gaze and discourse 
which…‘takes for granted and “normalizes” the hierarchical power 
relations generated by colonialism and imperialism, without necessar-
ily even thematizing those issues directly [sic]’.”22 She argues further 
that French cinema gravitated toward the marginalization, if not out-
right silencing, of “troubling postcolonial others”23 until the compara-
tively recent development of the beur cinema movement, begun in the 
early 1980s. During this time, beur directors and authors independently 
started producing small-scale works. These low-budget works, often 
autobiographically inspired, focused on the identity crises and socio-
economic difficulties experienced by second-generation immigrants.24
The first full-length feature film, widely recognized as the offi-
cial beginning of the beur cinema movement, was Le thé au harem 
d’Archimède, written and directed by Mehdi Charef. This 1985 film, 
based on Charef’s book, follows the story of Madjid, the son of Alge-
rian immigrants, and his français de souche (ethnic French) friend Pat as 
they roam the streets of Paris and its banlieues. Having just completed 
high school, they search for employment. However, there are an end-
less number of obstacles that stand in their way. One such barrier is the 
thinly veiled racism of employers, which results in Madjid’s rejection 
most of the time. The French ideal of equal opportunity seems not to 
apply to him. Even when he does finally manage to find an employer 
who is willing to hire him, he runs into a second hurdle that he cannot 
find a way around: his Algerian nationality. Although raised in France 
his entire life, Madjid does not possess French citizenship papers. 
While the most obvious answer would seem to be for him to apply for 
French citizenship, he is prevented from doing so by his mother, who 
wants him to remain Algerian and not disgrace the family. Meanwhile, 
Madjid is pressured to find a way to make money because his father 
cannot work. Pat, on the other hand, fails at finding a job mostly due 
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to his own laziness and lack of effort. Thus, the two boys resort to vari-
ous sorts of delinquency: trafficking prostitutes, pick-pocketing in the 
metro system, and stealing cars.
In his dreary and dismal depiction of the world of the Parisian ban-
lieues, Charef seems to criticize French society for its indifference to the 
difficulty of people’s lives on the margins of society. Yet at the same 
time, Charef does not allow his characters (neither beur nor French) to 
simply become victims of the society that they live in. All characters in 
the film face difficult situations that they choose to deal with in differ-
ent ways. The problem seems to be that no matter what they choose, 
whether it be on the right side of the law or not, they cannot manage 
to escape the realities of banlieue life. The French ideal of freedom is 
an illusive dream that morphs slowly into a nightmare. Rather than 
having the freedom and ability to make the “right” choices and work 
upward out of despair, the characters are slowly sucked into a down-
ward-spiraling free fall no matter what choices they make. They are set 
“free” by society, pushed to the edges, released and forgotten, aban-
doned and let drop to the bottom.
In the end, Madjid, Pat, and their friends steal a car and drive to the 
ocean in an attempt to escape from the inevitability of life in the banli-
eues. The police soon catch up with them, however. Unlike his friends 
who all flee (including Pat), Madjid seems to come to the conclusion 
that he is fighting a fruitless battle. He allows himself to be arrested. 
However, the last shot of the film shows Pat waiting at the side of the 
road for the police car, holding his thumb out like a hitchhiker and 
waiting for them to pick him up, too. He is unwilling to lose the sense 
of brotherhood he cultivated through his friendship with Madjid. It is 
more important than freedom, uniting them even in their despair and 
giving them a sense of hope.
Le thé au harem d’Archimède is a very good example of beur cin-
ema25 for many reasons. The fact that the screenplay was written and 
directed by a man of North African origin (specifically Algerian) dem-
onstrates the first steps of self-representation taken by beur directors. 
The film incorporates the theme of problematic identity in beur culture, 
posing questions as to whether the nature of identity is inherently 
innate or something you choose. Other common themes in beur cinema 
are family, friendship, immigration, unemployment, and delinquency. 
Most importantly, this particular film incorporates the emergence of 
identity in beur cinema as not only problematic, but also fluid.26 Charef 
challenges the one-dimensional French stereotypes of beurs as either 
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criminals or victims, allowing for the development of a deeper com-
prehension of the subject’s identity. The complexity and mastery of the 
work is that it shows how a single subject’s identity can be made up of 
multiple identities, held together despite their seemingly contradictory 
nature.
While the importance of beur filmmaking lies in its shift away from 
the specific gaze employed by the majority when looking at the situ-
ation of immigrants, and thus provides a new perspective from the 
immigrant’s point of view, there is a major critique of beur filmmak-
ing related to both this perspective and to identity. The fact that this 
new perspective is labeled as beur filmmaking itself threatens to lock 
these writers, directors, and performers into roles that produce a sort 
of typecasting and type-directing. In other words, rather than allow-
ing for varied, constantly changing identities, these actors become 
entrenched in the discourse of films about socioeconomic difference 
and ethnicity.27 This critique is voiced by director Karim Dridi express-
ing his concern about the attempt to enclose a certain cinematic genre 
within specific boundaries and rules, which he believes would be dan-
gerous for cinema itself.28 Indeed, his words allude to the threat of new 
cinematic territories where the work of directors and actors cannot 
cross borders freely—a reversion back to xenophobic restriction poli-
cies rather than freedom.
III. Maastricht: The Netherlands’ Muse29
A. North African Immigration to the Netherlands
As with France, decolonization played a major role in migration to 
the Netherlands. According to Dr. Marlou Schrover from the Univer-
siteit Leiden, the circumstances favoring migration during the period 
between the 1950s and 1980s in the Netherlands were somewhat similar 
to those of France and its former colonies. Schrover highlights how in 
both Surinam and Indonesia factors including both Dutch citizenship 
and a Dutch education enabled immigrants from these former colonies 
to migrate easily to the Netherlands.30 In addition, prior to its recog-
nition of Indonesia’s independence, the Netherlands went through a 
bloody military intervention in an attempt to preserve the country as a 
colony. In the end, this affected the opinions of the Dutch populace on 
migrants from Indonesia and immigration to the Netherlands in gen-
eral. Furthermore, the long-term consequences of immigration to the 
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Netherlands included terrorist attacks committed by Moluccan youth 
in the mid-1970s as a reaction to their environment of isolation caused 
by the policies of the Dutch government at that time.31
Although many of the problems of decolonization experienced by 
the French were similar to those of the Dutch, the history of North 
African immigration to the Netherlands is not as prominent as that to 
France. This is because the Dutch did not colonize North Africa. Thus, 
North African immigration to the Netherlands was primarily economic 
and based on labor needs rather than an effect of decolonization.32 
Jean-Claude Chesnais, head of the Social Economics Department at 
the Institute for Demographic Studies in Paris, estimates the number 
of foreign workers in the Netherlands originally from countries in the 
Maghreb in 1975 as follows (in thousands): Algeria: 0; Morocco: 28; 
Tunisia: 1; Maghreb: 9; and Turkey: 38. France had the following fig-
ures (in thousands): Algeria: 420; Morocco: 165; Tunisia: 90; Maghreb: 
675; and Turkey: 35.33 Here, it becomes obvious how many more immi-
grants from the Maghreb settled in France than in the Netherlands 
during the Trente Glorieuses, the thirty-year period after 1945 in which 
Europe, and especially France, received many foreign workers from 
North Africa.
More recently, Ayman Zohry cites Moroccans as the largest North 
African nationality among the migrants in Europe, represented at fifty-
six percent. In addition, nearly fifty percent of these migrants are con-
centrated in France, while the rest are dispersed throughout Germany, 
the United Kingdom, Spain, Belgium, and Italy. As France’s former 
colony and its most important partner in immigration, Algerians are 
the second largest North African population in Europe at thirty-one 
percent, ninety percent of whom are in France. Tunisians rank third 
at slightly over thirteen percent of the North African population in 
Europe, with seventy-five percent living in France and fifteen percent 
in Italy.34
Like many other researchers, Zohry does not mention the Nether-
lands when describing migrant population figures in Europe. This is 
most likely due to the smaller number of North African migrants in the 
Netherlands when compared to countries such as France, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, and Spain. However, this does not mean that North 
African immigration (and immigration in general) to the Netherlands 
did not have a significant impact on the country. A second factor may 
explain the traditional neglect of researchers to pay attention to North 
African immigration in the Netherlands. It is the fact that the immigra-
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tion generally happened later, with migrants moving through other 
receiving countries first (such as France), before moving to the Nether-
lands, thus affecting the Dutch awareness and opinions of immigration 
later than in other countries.
Unlike France, where labor migration from Morocco and Tunisia 
was regulated in the early 1960s, labor migration from Morocco was 
not officially regulated by the Dutch government until 1969, with the 
regulation of Tunisia following in 1970.35 Family reunification also hap-
pened later in the Netherlands than in France; families of guest workers 
were brought to the Netherlands in the 1980s. High youth unemploy-
ment was one of the major concerns of this time period. As mentioned 
above, internal migration of North African immigrants between Euro-
pean states was made easier by the Schengen agreement in 1985, in 
which France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and Luxembourg 
dissolved migration restrictions within their interior borders.36
According to Chavi Keeney Nana of the Migration Policy Insti-
tute, integration of immigrants into Dutch society did not become a 
major political issue until the rise of Pim Fortuyn’s Lijst (LPF) party in 
2002.37 Originally immigration policies in the Netherlands followed 
a relatively multicultural approach, aiming to involve immigrants in 
Dutch society while at the same time recognizing and accepting their 
differences.38 The notion of verzuiling, or “pillarization,” that domi-
nated Dutch society for a significant portion of the 20th century was 
intended to promote a multicultural society. Essentially, the idea was 
that each religious or social group would have its own political party, 
trade unions, schools, broadcasting stations, newspapers, and other 
associations, enabling plural societies to function independently in the 
same country without deep mixing. This appeared to work with the 
demographic make-up of the Netherlands that dominated during the 
previous time period,39 which was a predominantly Christian society, 
with the separation of Protestants and Catholics, socialists and liberals. 
It was not as successful, however, when applied to the case of Muslim 
immigrants, both those from Indonesia and those from North Africa.
In response to the growing diversity in the Netherlands (made 
apparent not only by higher numbers of minority populations but 
also by media representations of the effects of globalization in the 
Netherlands and in other countries), Dutch concerns have multiplied 
over topics ranging from the economy and job markets, to education, 
to terrorism. This is shown markedly by the support Pim Fortuyn’s 
party received for its policies on the suspension of new immigration 
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to the Netherlands and, in contrast to the previous pluralist notions of 
society, the integration of immigrants into “Dutch” society.40 Follow-
ing the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a Dutch-Moroccan 
Muslim extremist, the fear of Muslim minority youth radicalization in 
the Netherlands drove Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende and Min-
ister of Immigration Rita Verdonk to set up a roundtable discussion on 
minority participation in Dutch society, the Broad Initiative for Social 
Cohesion. According to Keeney Nana, “While the number of actual 
Islamic extremists is small…its support base is perceived to be large, 
fueled in part by the poor socio-economic standing of minority groups, 
discrimination, and their outsider status in the mainstream Dutch soci-
ety.”41 In response to this initiative, a large number of social organiza-
tions expanded their efforts to involve minorities in Dutch society, 
focusing particularly on the development of youth leadership through 
education and employment. Two concepts in particular emphasized 
interaction and involvement between marginalized groups and the 
mainstream population: “bonding” and “citizenship.”42 This debate 
essentially centers on the notion of what constitutes Dutch identity.
B. The Recent Discovery of a “Dutch” National Identity
As the nation that legalized same-sex marriage, abortion, euthana-
sia, prostitution, and marijuana use, the Netherlands was traditionally 
viewed as a country that would tolerate almost anything. Over the 
years, the Dutch tendency for finding compromises between oppo-
nents through a seemingly endless form of negotiation has become 
known as the poldermodel. This propensity for compromise and agree-
ing to meet halfway manifested itself in the pluralistic tradition of 
socio-political pillarization that the Dutch cultivated from the late 
1800s to the 1960s. As previously mentioned, society was divided by 
denominations: Catholics, Protestants, and to a lesser extent, Social-
ists and Liberals. According to Wiebe Nauta of Maastricht Univer-
sity, pillarization was aimed at combining group-based autonomy with 
consultation and compromise at the elite level.43 Despite this intense 
segregation, these different segments of Dutch society coexisted peace-
fully for many years. While pillarization’s importance decreased with 
the country’s increasing secularization and individualization from the 
1960s onward, the institutional legacies of this system are still seen in 
the Netherlands today.44
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In the context of globalization, the Netherlands is experiencing 
many societal changes similar to those in the rest of Western Europe. 
The flood of immigration from North Africa in the last few decades has 
put pressure on the society’s ability to cope with racial, ethnic, and reli-
gious differences as people compete for educational and employment 
opportunities. Furthermore, columnist Molly Moore of the Washing-
ton Post conveys the notion that this situation is exacerbated by wor-
ries over terrorism, the infiltration of organized crime into the (legal) 
prostitution and drug trade, and Holland’s image as “an international 
tourist destination for drugs and sexual debauchery.”45 She cites James 
Kennedy, Professor of Contemporary History at the Free University 
of Amsterdam, who contends that, “There is an uneasiness about glo-
balization that the Dutch don’t have control over their own country 
anymore.”46 Thus, globalization is pressuring the Netherlands in ways 
that compel its citizens to question their perceptions of Dutch identity 
in relation to external forces and opinions. In other words, the nation is 
struggling to redefine its core values.
As noted earlier, the current political discourse in the Netherlands 
has shifted from a multicultural stance on the integration of Mus-
lims toward a tougher, more one-sided assimilatory approach.47 The 
immense support for immigrant integration policies that do not tol-
erate different cultures or religions (particularly Islam) is evidenced 
in the rapid rise to political power of Pim Fortuyn, an anti-immigra-
tion, anti-Muslim politician who sharply criticized what he called “the 
Islamic dilution of Dutch values.”48 His murder just before the 2002 
election by an Animal Rights activist, as well as that of the prominent 
film director Theo van Gogh by a Dutch-Moroccan fundamentalist two 
years later, have been cited repeatedly in debates on these topics. In 
Murder in Amsterdam, Ian Buruma explores the cases of Pim Fortuyn 
and Theo van Gogh in relation to these issues and comes to one conclu-
sion that touches on the importance of youth and alludes to the iden-
tity crisis of second- and third-generation immigrants:
Tolerance, then, has its limits even for Dutch progressives. It is easy to 
be tolerant of those who are much like ourselves, whom we feel we can 
trust instinctively, whose jokes we understand, who share our sense of 
irony…It is much harder to extend the same principle to strangers in our 
midst, who find our ways as disturbing as we do theirs, who watch fear-
fully as their own children, caught in between, slip from the paternal grasp into 
a new and bewildering world [my emphasis].49
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In general, it is accepted that the increasing presence of Islam in 
Europe today is a result of immigration. However, views differ on 
the nature of Muslim identities in Europe and their relationship to 
“European” secular modes of thinking. The adherence to the “Clash of 
Civilizations” theory between Islam and Western Europe is the most 
basic point of divergence, with academics such as Jytte Klausen, Ian 
Buruma, and Amartya Sen on one side, and on the other the adherents 
favoring Pim Fortuyn’s anti-Muslim notions, namely, Rita Verdonk, 
Geert Wilders, and Jean-Marie Le Pen.
C. Mocro Movies: Bang or Bust?
Unlike beur cinema in France, mocro cinema only developed in the 
last decade in the Netherlands. The word “mocro” is Dutch slang for 
“Moroccan” and appears to have been first used to refer to specific 
films in 2005. While the historical use of the term isn’t as developed 
and discussed as the French term beur, mocro would be the most accu-
rate translation of the term into Dutch. Following the success of native 
Dutch director Albert ter Heerdt’s Shouf Shouf Habibi! (Hush Hush 
Baby!) in 2004, Karin Wolfs explored issues of mocro authorship in an 
article for the Dutch film magazine, Film Krant. Similar to the French 
film industry, Dutch films in the past represented North Africans in 
only minor roles, as either criminals or victims. According to Wolfs, 
ter Heerdt emphasized how, in the past, films about immigration were 
referred to as “box-office poison” by both directors and producers 
alike.50 Like beur cinema, the development of mocro films seemed to 
somewhat coincide with the Dutch struggle over identity, perhaps as 
a reaction to growing tensions around immigration and xenophobia. 
This is evidenced by the fact that it closely followed the rise to power 
of nationalist parties such as Pim Fortuyn’s Lijst. However, there are 
two distinct differences between these two film genres.
First, unlike Mehdi Charef’s Le thé au harem d’Archimède and other 
more serious films realized nearly twenty years earlier, Shouf Shouf 
Habibi! is a light-hearted comedy that plays on the stereotypes and 
idiosyncrasies of both the native Dutch and Moroccan immigrant fami-
lies.51 A second significant difference concerns the question of mocro 
authorship. For the most part, the directors are all native Dutch whose 
families have lived in the Netherlands for generations. Even the most 
involved ethnically North African individuals in the Dutch film indus-
try have not yet directed a film or written a screenplay without the 
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contribution of native Dutch directors and writers. This is the case even 
with Mimoun Oaïssa, who co-wrote Shouf Shouf Habibi! with Albert ter 
Heerdt, contributed additional dialogue to Martin Koolhoven’s 2005 
release Het Schnitzelparadijs, and performed lead roles in both of the 
previously mentioned films as well as ter Heerdt’s 2007 release Kicks, 
but has not yet had the opportunity to write a screenplay or direct a 
film on his own.52 Despite these differences, both beur and mocro cin-
ema tend to focus, on the one hand, on the stereotypes and “otherness” 
of North Africans in Europe, and on the other hand, on the problems 
and successes of integration.
After the success of Shouf Shouf Habibi! demonstrated the profitabil-
ity of comedies about Moroccan-Dutch relations, interest in making 
mocro films skyrocketed.53 Yet there is still a distinct absence of Dutch-
Moroccan or Dutch-Turkish directors, screenwriters, and producers in 
Dutch cinema. One straightforward answer to this puzzle might be the 
problem of scale. According to David Deprez of the Maastricht Lumière 
Cinema, there is a near-total lack of multicultural aspects in Dutch cin-
ema because the production scene is so small. There is only one Film 
Commission giving funds to filmmakers. Fehd el Ouali believes this 
should not be a major cause for concern for the reason that a Moroccan 
screenwriter or director would be more familiar with Moroccan idio-
syncrasies, gestures, or expressions.54 However, Mimoun Oaïssa warns 
against such generalizations by claiming that there is no Moroccan 
community in the Netherlands, only the Dutch community.55 Yet this 
might be beside the point. The emphasis here should be on the ability 
of Moroccan-Dutch individuals to develop identities that fit who they 
are, without being restricted to stereotypical subject positions created 
by the dominant discourse on Dutch identity. As seen in France, even 
with second-generation North African screenwriters and directors, it is 
still difficult for actors and writers to escape typecasting and essential-
ist labeling of film genres. With the lack of Moroccan directors, screen-
writers, and producers in the Netherlands, it will be that much harder 
for Dutch-Moroccan immigrants to break out of the stereotypes.
Albert ter Heerdt’s Shouf Shouf Habibi! demonstrates the continual 
and unfazed use of stereotypes in Dutch cinema. Mimoun Oaïssa plays 
the protagonist, Ap, who expresses his disgust at the idea of having to 
live in Morocco (filmed as a land of desert without cities or trees), and 
relief that his father and mother moved to the Netherlands. The plot 
revolves around the escapades of Ap’s family, varying from his moth-
er’s comedic attempts to seek revenge on his father for mistreating her; 
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his sister Liela’s continual rejections of marriage proposals and secret 
relationship with a native Dutch actor; his younger brother taking 
pictures of Muslim girls with their headscarves off at school and black-
mailing them for money to not show their fathers; his older brother’s 
affair with a fellow policewoman; and his friends’ plans to rob a bank. 
Meanwhile, Ap himself struggles to search for a job—but not too hard. 
He falls asleep waiting for his interview, expresses ridiculous expecta-
tions at the local job center, believing that they will call Steven Spiel-
berg to offer him a role in a film, and, when he finally does have the job 
he claims to have dreamed of, he arrives an hour late on his first day, 
having forgotten about daylight savings time. To top it off, Ap sneaks 
out of his own wedding after realizing the commitment it will take.
Mimoun’s character in Shouf Shouf Habibi! differs significantly from 
Madjid in Le thé au harem d’Archimède, particularly in the treatment of 
his unemployed status. Ap is not seen as victimized at all. Though he 
spends the entire film searching for a job, even when he gets one he is 
portrayed as completely incompetent and lazy, thus losing it again in 
the end. At most, the message the film manages to convey is that this 
kid just wants to hang out with his friends at the bar and play pool—
and marry a lusty Moroccan virgin. In Het Schnitzelparadijs, the main 
character appears to have the same issue with laziness; he has a good 
education, is intelligent, and his father wants him to be a doctor, yet he 
chooses instead to wash dishes in the local hotel kitchen. Thus, these 
films emphasize that stereotypical Moroccan laziness is what prevents 
these Moroccan youths from finding good employment, rather than 
raising questions of racism or identity.
In regard to the production of mocro films, Mimoun Oaïssa points to 
four states of improvement with regard to immigrants’ image. In the 
first stage, no “foreigners” are seen onscreen. Foreigners are present 
in the second stage, but they are seen only by “white eyes” and given 
cliché roles. Stage three represents a deepening of those clichés as in 
Shouf Shouf Habibi!. In the final stage, immigrants are approached as 
people.56 Unfortunately, this formula for the integration of immigrants 
into film culture in the Netherlands is oversimplified. While the first 
three stages seem relatively clear-cut and realistic, the jump between 
the third and fourth stages is not. Oaïssa does not go into detail about 
how a deepening of stereotypes in films leads to the ultimate rejection 
of those stereotypes. In fact, this seems to be the exact opposite of the 
beur cinema movement ideal of fluid identity, focusing rather on the 
fixing and deepening of identity stereotypes. The Dutch film industry 
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will have to come to terms with this issue if it wants to successfully 
promote the integration of immigrants into Dutch society.
IV. Conclusion
In studying migrant film in both France and the Netherlands, I learned 
several lessons related to culture, identity, and the phenomenon of 
globalization. First, at the base level, is the difficulty and importance 
of raising issues no one talks about. The beur cinema movement in 
France has received attention from critics since its début in the 1980s. 
Mocro movies, in comparison, have received very little academic atten-
tion either inside the Netherlands or outside the country. Although the 
Dutch cannot be blamed for this lack, given the relative youth of this 
kind of cinema in their country as compared to France, the point is that 
the current absence of any such research makes it very difficult to break 
ground and move forward with a concise analysis. Yet this should not 
deter researchers at any level from looking at these phenomena. It is 
important to get the discussion started. Expertise will mature as the 
fruits of research weather critique and ripen into knowledge.
This leads to the second point, namely, the importance of the immi-
gration debate in Europe. Within the last half-century, all levels of soci-
ety felt the impact of the dramatic increase in immigration from North 
Africa to Europe. Critics of immigration cite Samuel Huntington’s 
“Clash of Civilizations” thesis when they claim that this immigration, 
originally dominated by Muslim manoeuvres (manual laborers) and 
their families, is detrimental to European society and values. Many 
Europeans feel threatened by Islamist extremism and socioeconomic 
worries about employment. However, the rising trend of nationalism 
and Islamophobia is matched by a reactionary “re-Islamization” of 
second-generation immigrants as well as a push for multicultural tol-
erance.
Thus, a third lesson shows how, in this climate of uncertainty, the 
metamorphosis of identity is a delicate issue in which film has several 
roles to play. The representation and portrayal of ethnic identity are 
important, but only to a certain extent. Individuals in both France and 
the Netherlands want to be recognized as talented actors and direc-
tors, not just spokespersons for their ethnic communities. Films enable 
directors to present their versions of reality, but in order to have the 
freedom to do this, they must not be tied down to specific “cultural” 
themes. Actress Maryam Hassouni puts her feelings plainly: “I am 
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Dutch. With Moroccan parents.” Though she has a Moroccan heritage, 
she sees herself as Dutch and feels she shouldn’t be limited by other 
peoples’ perceptions of her. She expresses her pleasure at the potential 
of playing a Dutch girl. Even more radically, her dream role is to play a 
Ninja: “Fatima by day, Ninja by night.”57 For Hassouni, then, films pro-
vide an outlet for personal expression. For now, she is content to play 
Muslim roles, but she doesn’t want to do it continuously.58 Karim Dridi 
expresses similar sentiments when critiquing the French film industry 
notions of beur, banlieue, and cinéma sociale, refusing to have his work 
put in a box or analyzed from only one point of view.59
Although some of these films make a more serious attempt to show 
the world “the way it is” and promote a certain view of identity, it is 
important to retain the ability to view these films with a critical eye 
from all angles. This is essential to our ability to constantly redefine 
our identities. According to Michael Featherstone, cultural representa-
tions facilitated by the film industry work to bridge public and private 
life, connecting people across time and space, and reshaping existing 
cultural signifiers to fit a new discourse of cultural identity.60
Viewing the current climate of globalization as a confrontation 
between different religious and cultural divisions is a mistake. It 
ignores life’s complexity, reducing human identity to a few, oversim-
plified adjectives, such as “Muslim” or “French,” and disregarding 
the many other ways in which people perceive themselves. In Identity 
and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny, Amartya Sen explores notions of 
identity, developing the idea that human beings can belong to various 
groups simultaneously without contradicting themselves.61 Through 
our ability to reason, we are able to discern within particular contexts 
the relative importance of these multifarious loyalties. Furthermore, in 
saying that “Nationalism does not simply ‘express’ a preexistent iden-
tity: it ‘constitutes’ a new one,” Michael Ignatieff alludes to the power 
that discourse and context can have on the construction of identity.62
In this light, do post-migrant film movements in Europe promote a 
new “alternative language” by which all Europeans can come to terms 
with their so-called “differences” and forge a new definition of Euro-
pean identity? This can only be so if identities are allowed to remain a 
process, rather than a fixed entity. Labeling specific subject positions 
as concrete identities only allows for the reproduction of stereotypes, 
not for the creation of new identities. Both French and Dutch films 
risk falling into the trap of reproducing cultural stereotypes. However, 
while the development of the beur cinema movement seems to work 
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toward expanding modes of representation, mocro films seem only to 
reproduce these stereotypes. The key to the Dutch ability to change 
this trend may lie in the promotion of directors, producers, and screen-
writers of North African origin who can free themselves from the cur-
rent Dutch discourse on mocro film that promotes the reproduction of 
stereotypes. Furthermore, a healthy public discourse on this subject is 
needed to sustain such a venture.
Stuart Hall, in the epigraph at the beginning of this essay, makes a 
very clear point that ties in well with this discussion. Identity is con-
structed, therefore it is a continual process constituted within represen-
tation, not outside it. Cinema should not be seen “as a mirror held up 
to reflect what already exists, but as that form of representation which 
is able to constitute us as new kinds of subjects, and thereby enable us 
to discover who we are.”63 Film allows for new forms of representation 
and the creation of new identities. Thus, films enable the expression 
of hybrid identities based on their fluidity more than on connections 
to ethnicity or nationality. Perhaps this is the most important lesson: 
In the era of globalization, identities are best constituted through the 
conscious effort of exposing them to new contexts and improving 
them through the process of critical adaptation,64 which assesses and 
rewrites both old and new identities. Films at once allow exposure to 
new conceptions of identity and an outlet for the expression of individ-
ual identities. The growth of the global media industry has increased 
the availability of new forms of identity expression while connecting 
the adherents to specific identities throughout the world. •
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